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Capturing the Effects of Capital Subsidies
DAVID LIM
Most developing countries provide fiscal incentives to encourage domestic and foreign
investment. This study shows that these schemes subsidise significantly the use of capital and
produce greater capital intensity in Malaysian manufacturing. These results were obtained
by conducting the analysis at the establishment level, which avoids the artificial aggregation
of establishments with different production structures into an industry-group and having to
choose an appropriate weighting system in the aggregation process.
INTRODUCTION
Most developing countries provide quite elaborate tax incentive schemes to encourage local
and foreign investment in industry. These include investment tax credits, accelerated
depreciation, preferential treatment of capital imports and income tax holidays whose
duration may or may not depend on the level of capital expenditure.
Most of the incentives, prima facie, result in net subsidies to capital. If, at the same time,
government labour regulations produce wage rates which exceed the opportunity cost of
labour, then the resulting prices of capital and labour affect the capital intensity of
manufacturing by influencing the choice of technique, the choice of industry, or both. While
the theoretical literature on the effect of capital subsidies on capital intensity is well
developed, the empirical literature is much less so. The problems emanate from the difficulty
of measuring the extent of capital subsidy at a level of disaggregation which allows for a
meaningful empirical verification of the hypothesis that the provision of capital subsidies
increases capital intensity. This problem will be illustrated by examining the Malaysian case.
The first tax legislation in Malaysia was the Pioneer Industries (Relief from Income Tax)
Ordinance of 1958, where firms granted pioneer status were exempted from the company tax.
The duration of the tax holiday varied directly with the level of capital invested. The latest
investment incentive legislation is the Promotion of Investment Act of 1986. Bet- ween this
and the 1958 ordinance a number of incentives apart from the tax holiday for pioneer firms
have been introduced. These include an investment tax allowance, which is an alternative to
the tax holiday, an accelerated depreciation allowance, a reinvestment allowance and
preferential treatment of capital imports.
The first tax holiday introduced provided for tax exemption for two years for companies
which invested less than $100,000 (Malaysian dollars). For those investing more than
$100,000 but less than $250,000 the exemption was for three years, while those investing
more than $250,000 were given a five-year holiday. What was offered was thus a capital
investment-based and not a profit-based tax holiday. This arrangement continued until 1986
when a tax holiday of five years became available regardless of the level of investment.
At present the investment tax allowance can be up to 100 per cent of the qualifying capital
expenditure incurred during the first five years. The accelerated depreciation allowance
permits an initial allowance of 20 per cent and an annual allowance of 40 per cent. In the past
it was even more generous since with an initial allowance of 20 per cent and an annual
allowance of 80 per cent it amounted to an immediate write-off of the capital expenditure.
The current reinvestment allowance is 25 per cent of the capital expenditure incurred in
expanding plant, machinery and factory building. It used to be 40 per cent. The preferential

treatment of capital imports takes the form of the exemption of customs duties on raw
materials and machinery not available locally. The level of exemption depends on the extent
to which the finished products are sold domestically or overseas.
It can be seen that these incentives attempt to encourage investment by subsidising the cost of
capital, the tax holiday indirectly by linking the duration of the tax exemption to the level of
investment, the others directly by reducing the cost of capital expenditure.
In a recent study Agell [1986] attempted to estimate, at the country level, the level of subsidy
provided to capital through the granting of tax incentives in Malaysia and other countries in
ASEAN. The model used assumes that the firm aims to maximise its value to the
shareholders when planning to invest a dollar in new machinery and equipment. The firm
operates under perfect certainty and finances its investment by some exogenously determined
combination of retained earnings, new issues and borrowing.
The study shows that a very high subsidy rate is provided to capital. With an inflation rate
often per cent and the funding consisting of 10 per cent of new issues, 30 per cent from
borrowing and 60 per cent from retained earnings, the subsidy rate is no lower than 79 per
cent for pioneer firms and 120 per cent for non-pioneer ones (Table 1). The generous scheme
for accelerated depreciation has accounted for the high subsidy rates for non-pioneer firms.
The provision for an immediate write-off has since been replaced by a less generous one
which permits an initial allowance of 20 per cent and an annual allowance of 40 per cent.
Pioneer firms face lower capital costs than non-pioneer firms when the inflation rate is zero.
However, the reverse holds with increases in the inflation rate, as 'inflation sets a profitable
tax holiday firm at a relative disadvantage owing to its inability to make leverage gains via
the deductibility of nominal interest payments during the tax-exempt period' [Agell, 1986:
71].
This finding of a high subsidy rate for capital in Malaysia is supported by a recent World
Bank study [1988]. It uses a simulation model to estimate the before-tax cash flow and the
after-tax cash flow that can be expected from an investment project. The after-tax cash flow
is the before-tax cash flow less any taxes paid but plus any tax credits provided by the
investment incentives (for example, deductions for interest rate payments, accelerated
depreciation allowance and loss offsets). The percentage difference in the rate of return
generated by the before-tax cash flow and the after-tax one shows the level of capital subsidy.
The larger the percentage difference the greater will be the capital subsidy. The World Bank
calls the percentage difference the marginal effective tax rate (METR).

The calculations for METR were carried out at the country level for nine developing
countries in East Asia, including Malaysia. The results for Malaysia, given in Table 2, show
that its METR is significantly below its statutory corporate income tax rate of 40 per cent, the
difference depending on the level of debt financing. While its statutory rate makes it, together
with Singapore, the highest taxed nation, its METR is ranked only fifth, with all equity
financing, and sixth, with a 50 per cent debt financing. The calculations were based on
minimum allowances. When other allowances are included the METR drops markedly. Thus
for a pioneer firm with a debt financing of 50 per cent, a tax holiday of ten years
accompanied by various loss offsets can result in a METR of only four per cent.
Various investment incentives tend to provide substantial subsidies to capital. Various laws
tend to make labour relatively more expensive in Malaysia than the market rate.
Minimum wage legislation in Malaysia (as reflected in the Wage Councils Act of 1947) is
limited to only a very small section of the labour market. Other laws have more impact on
labour costs, the most important of these being the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) Act and
the Employment Act of 1955 with its stipulations with regard to overtime and termination
(severance) benefits. The EPF Act provides a provident fund at the disposal of an employee
when he retires, emigrates, dies or is incapacitated. Once continuous employment of over a
month with the same employer has been established, both the employee and the employer
have to contribute monthly to the EPF, the former at nine per cent of the wage and the latter
at 11 per cent. The operation of the EPF thus adds significantly to the cost of labour as far as
employers are concerned.
So, too, does the operation of the Employment Act of 1955. Under this, any overtime work in
excess of the nominal work programmes has to be paid at a rate which is at least equal to one
and a half times the hourly rate. The normal work programme is defined as one not exceeding
eight hours per day spread over a continuous period of ten hours inclusive of any period of

leisure, rest or break. The act also provides that an employee who has been continuously
employed for not less than 12 months is entitled to receive termination or lay-off benefits.
The mini- mum termination benefit is equivalent to between four and eight per cent of the
salary.
CAPITAL SUBSIDIES AND CAPITAL INTENSITY The Malaysian government thus
provides substantial capital subsidies and operates labour legislation which further decreases
the cost of capital relative to that of labour. This much is clear. What is not quite so clear is
the effect that the provision of capital subsidies has on capital intensity. The existing
empirical studies are unsatisfactory [Agell, 1986; World Bank, 1988; Lint, 1980; 1981] and
claims that government policies have encouraged firms to use socially non-optimum capitalintensive processes are based largely on a priori and qualitative analyses.

A survey of the existing studies suggests that the most appropriate way to capture the effect
of capital subsidies on capital intensity would be to have a study which is conducted at the
establishment level and which uses a direct measure of the relative costs of capital and
labour. A study at the establishment level would have a much bigger sample of observations
and therefore produce results that are more meaningful statistically. It would also not
artificially combine firms from technically different production lines into one industry-group
and so avoid producing results that have little use for policy-makers. The biggest sample used

in the existing studies is 28 and serious doubts can be raised about the usefulness of any study
that treats, for example, the food industry-group, with its multi- faceted activities, as only one
observation. A study at the establishment level would also eliminate the difficult problem of
deciding what weight to use in deriving variables at the industry-group level. The use of a
direct measure of the relative costs of capital and labour would avoid the problems associated
with the use of proxy variables. However, the possibility of obtaining reliable data on the
price of capital at the establishment level is very small and the use of proxy measures of
capital subsidies cannot be helped.
The data required for using the formula proposed by Agell [7956] to estimate the cost of
capital to an establishment are simply not available. Data are needed for the different tax
rates (for example, the corporate tax rate and the capital gains tax rate), the tax incentive
parameters (for example, the tax holiday rate and the initial investment allowance), the
macroeconomic variables (for example, the inflation rate), and the establishment-specific
variables (for example, the depreciation rate and the percentage of the project financed by
new issues). While data on the macroeconomic variables and the tax rates apply to all
establishments and are easily available, the same cannot be said of the tax incentives granted
to individual establishments and the establishment-specific vari- ables. Agell conducted his
analysis only at the country level and even at this level of aggregation somewhat heroic
assumptions had to be made about the types of incentives available in each country and the
methods of financing the investment project for each country. The World Bank study [29SS]
was also at the country level. Analysis at a less aggregated level was not possible because
data do not exist on the diversity of incentives that have been granted to individual firms. The
study had to use hypothetical data.
Two formulae for estimating the cost of capital which require less data are available. One is
to define the cost of capital (Pk) as the cost of owning one 'unit' of productive capital stock
for a year, where the 'unit' of productive capital is a dollar's worth of imported capital
equipment. then given by
Pk = Ek (1+Tk )(1 - Su )(r- s + d)

(1)

where Ek is the rate of exchange applicable to capital imports, Tk the average tariff applicable
to capital imports, Su the percentage subsidy on the price of capital, r the real rate of interest,
s the percentage rate of subsidy on the interest rate and d the real rate of depreciation. Pk
consists therefore of two parts, the first showing the cost of purchasing the capital equipment,
the second the opportunity cost of owning it.
Malaysia does not have a separate exchange rate for the import of capital goods so that Ek can
be eliminated from the formula. Provided that the capital goods imported are shown to be
critical to the production process and are not available locally, they are not subject to any
import duty. This means that Tk can also be dropped from the formula. While technically
Malaysia does not provide for concessional pricing for the purchase of imported goods by
administering such schemes as bonus vouchers or investment permissions systems, it does
provide investment incentives which subsidise capital and therefore capital goods. This
means that Su will have to be retained in the formula, which then becomes:
Pk = (1 - Su )(r- s + d)

(2)

The data required for estimating Pk, with this reduced formula, at the establishment level are
not available. Nor are they available at the industry-group level. It is possible to obtain rough

estimates of Su with data from the Department of Statistics and the Malaysian Industrial
Development Authority (MIDA). However, there are no data on the price index of capital
goods by industry-group so that the real rate of interest and the real rate of depreciation by
industry-group cannot be calculated. Also, there are no data which would allow reliable
estimates of the percentage rate of subsidy on the interest rate to be obtained. Data on the rate
of depreciation are also not available.
Even if data for all of the variables in equation (2) were available, the estimate for Pk would
still not give an accurate picture of the cost of capital. The formula is designed for estimating
the cost of imported capital, partly because a significant part of the capital equipment used is
imported and partly because data on the cost of domestically produced capital equipment are
not available. As an important part of the capital is domestically produced (for example,
plants), the cost of capital estimated using equation (2) will not be reliable.
The other formula comes from Jorgenson [1967] and is given by
Pk = (1/1-t) (rp + dp - pt)

(3)

where Pk is the 'user' cost of capital, t the corporate tax rate, r the interest rate, p the price
index of capital goods, d the real depreciation rate and α the depreciation allowance rate
which is deductible before tax.
This formula has been used for estimating Pk for broad economic sectors, as, for example, in
the study by Guisinger and Kazi [7975] on the rental cost of capital for the manufacturing
sector of Pakistan. However, the data required for estimating Pk at the establishment or
industry-group level are not available in most developing countries, including Malaysia. Data
on the rate of depreciation and on the price index of capital goods for the different industrygroups are not available. As the rates of depreciation and price increases vary between
industry-groups, the absence of data for them would render any estimate of the cost of capital
by establishment or industry-group rather unreliable.
Under prevailing conditions in Malaysia a proxy measure of capital subsidy is necessary. The
dummy variable PS is used where a value of 1 is given to each of the establishments which
was granted pioneer status and a value of 0 to each which was not granted or did not seek
pioneer status. It is true that the study by Agell [2986] shows that a pioneer establishment,
with the maximum tax holiday of eight years, receives less capital subsidy than a non-pioneer
establishment enjoying an immediate capital expenditure write-off, when the inflation rate is
more than five per cent. Thus where non-pioneer establishments are more important than
pioneer ones in terms of fixed assets, value added and employment, and where the inflation
rate exceeds five per cent, the use of PS at the industry-group level would understate the level
of capital subsidy. However, inflation has never been high for a lengthy period in Malaysia.
Also, pioneer establishments greatly outnumber non-pioneer ones with incentives and are
also far more important in terms of fixed assets, value added and employment. Thus the
problem of understating the level of capital subsidy at both the establishment and industrygroup levels is not a serious one.
The analysis was carried out for Peninsular Malaysia at the establishment level for 1979, the
last year when the Malaysian Department of Statistics collected data on pioneer
establishments. There were 4985 manufacturing establishments in that year and the following
equation was estimated to explain the variation in capital intensity between them.

K/L = f (PS,F,S,I)

(4)

Capital intensity was measured by K/L, in thousands of Malaysian dollars, where K is the
replacement value of the fixed assets and L the total number of full-time employees. PS was
measured by giving a value of one (zero) to each of the establishments which were (were not)
granted pioneer status. If the provision of capital subsidies resulted in greater capital
intensity, K/L and PS would be positively and significantly related.
The estimating equation contains three other determinants: F, the degree of foreign ownership
and control, S, the scale of operation and I, the degree of incorporation. Some of the pioneer
firms which are foreign and large may have been able to obtain capital subsidies, even
without enjoying pioneer status, simply because of their foreign status and size. To isolate the
separate influences of pioneer status, foreign ownership and size on capital intensity, F and S
were also entered as determinants in the estimating equation. F was measured by giving a
value of 1(0) to each of the establishments which were (were not) foreign-owned or controlled. F is expected to be positively related to K/L. Another reason for expecting a positive
relationship between F and K/L is the possibility that foreign firms prefer using their homebased, and usually capital-intensive, technology, regardless of the relative factor prices. S
was measured by the sales of the establishment in thousands of Malaysian dollars and was
expected to be positively related to K/L. Another reason for expecting such a relationship is
the lumpiness of capital which limits the scope for using capital-intensive techniques by
small-scale firms. I was measured by giving a value of one (zero) to each of the
establishments which were (were not) incorporated. As unincorporated establishments are
much less likely to be granted capital subsidies and more likely to pay below-award wages,
K/L and I are expected to be positively related.
The results are given in Table 3. The PS variable came out with the expected positive sign
and is statistically significant in both of the equations. The results are therefore unambiguous
in suggesting that the provision of capital subsidies, as measured by the PS variable, did
encourage greater capital intensity in Malaysian manufacturing in 1979. The I variable also
appeared with a statistically significant and positive coefficient. As incorporated
establishments are more likely to be granted capital subsidies, this result may be said to lend
further support to that for the PS variable.
The scale of operation, S, also had a positive effect on capital intensity. On the other hand, it
appears that the presence of foreign ownership and control had no effect, as the coefficient of
F was not statistically significant in either of the two equations.
The estimating equations were statistically significant with the F-ratios obtained. The
adjusted coefficients of determination are also relatively high, when compared to those
obtained at the establishment level for such a large sample.
It is unfortunate that the Department of Statistics stopped collecting data on pioneer firms
after 1979 and that the data required for a similar analysis are not easily available for a more
recent year. In order to ensure that the results obtained for 1979 are not peculiar to that year,
the same analysis was carried out for 1976 for 3995 establishments. The results are also given
in Table 3. They show, also quite clearly, that the provision of capital subsidies had led to
greater capital intensity among manufacturing establishments. The PS variable came out with
positive and very statistically significant coefficients as did the F, I and S variables. The
equations as a whole are also statistically significant and the adjusted coefficients of
determination are slightly larger than those obtained for 1979.

CONCLUSIONS
There are many good reasons for preferring the results estimated at the establishment level to
those estimated at the industry-level. These include using a far larger number of observations,
avoiding the artificial aggregation of establishments with different production structures into
an industry-group and not having to decide on an appropriate weight in the aggregation
process. These reasons strongly suggest that the results obtained in this paper should be taken
more seriously than those obtained earlier at the industry level. The fact that they are also
unambiguous should further strengthen their case. An important lesson, therefore, for work
on the impact of capital subsidies on capital intensity in other countries is that the analysis
should be carried out at the level of the establishment and not the industry-group.
This then leads to the other important issue, that of obtaining reliable data on the value of the
capital subsidy given to an establishment. Both the new and the old analyses can be criticised
for using a measure which is only a proxy for the presence of capital subsidy. A direct
measure would have been preferable as it would have avoided all the problems associated
with the use of a proxy. Also it would have measured the level of the capital subsidy.
However, the chances of obtaining reliable data on the value of the capital subsidy at the
establishment level are remote, no matter what formula is used. Realistically, empirical
studies on the effect of providing capital subsidies on capital intensity will have to depend
either on the qualitative responses of business obtained by questionnaire or on the
quantitative analysis obtained by using proxy measures for the presence and/or level of
capital subsidy. The study of Malaysian manufacturing suggests that it is possible to carry out
the latter and produce results which are statistically and economically meaningful.
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